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Sexual selection theory provides interesting tools to address the evolution of human art behavior  as it contains models that explain the evolution of elaborate male display traits and these traits exhibit conspicuous similarities with human art behavior. In sexual selection theory, it is recently suggested sensory exploitation hypothesis offers a valuable alternative to good genes and Fisherian runaway. Because, one, it can explain the origins of male display traits while good genes and Fisherian runaway cannot, and two, it can even explain how these traits are maintained, namely without the need of any selection on female preferences in the sexual context, thus solely by female sensory biases maintained by selection in another context. Good genes and Fisherian runaway were previously applied to model the evolution of human art and aesthetics. The above implies application of sensory exploitation to model human art could offer a valuable addition to these models. I use some of the concepts (like dual inheritance) developed by the authors of the cultural runaway hypothesis, Boyd and Richerson, to develop a model for the evolution of art based on sensory exploitation hypothesis applied to the cultural level, which I call cultural sensory exploitation hypothesis. Boyd and Richerson's model suggest human aesthetic and artistic expression evolve as a consequence of a cultural runaway process, but in my proposed model they can originate even without this process. Finally, I use this hypothesis to address the conundrum of the creative explosion, a burst of elaborate art some 50,000 years ago and the sudden emergence of cave paintings. I conclude that some evidence indicates that the creative explosion was a consequence of a change in effective population size (i.e. interacting pool of social learners), which made maintenance of innovations necessary for the production of elaborate art possible. These innovations were maintained and selected because they offered the ability to (self)exploit preexisting sensory biases through art. In this view it does not matter whether art initially served any function in human evolution as it readily evolves as a mere consequence of sensory biases. In other words I suggest that the incidental exploitability of sensory biases through art may be the most fundamental driving force behind the origin of art and that it may play an important role in its subsequent maintenance and evolution as well.
INTRODUCTION
	
Approaching human artistic behavior from a cross species biological perspective seems to almost automatically lead to sexual selection. The conspicuous similarities between mostly male traits which evolved under intersexual selection pressures and the different artistic expressions in humans are hard to ignore. Many male animals display colorful traits and engage in behaviors to court females like singing and dancing (Andersson, 1994) with apparent similarities to human dance and music. Male bower birds even build and decorate bowers - experimenting with various decorations (mosses, ferns, orchids, snail shells, berries and bark) in various positions, rearranging them, combining them in clusters of uniform color. Regent and Satin Bowerbirds even use a wad of leaves or bark to paint their bower with regurgitated fruit residues (Miller, 2000).  All these efforts only to the end of mating. To Darwin (1871, p 301) it was clear the evolution of these male traits could only be explained as evolutionary outcomes of a female sense of beauty: “When we behold a male bird elaborately displaying his graceful plumes or splendid colours before the female, whilst other birds, not thus decorated, make no such display, it is impossible to doubt that she admires the beauty of her male partner.” So, Darwin (1871, p 302) assumed we share our tastes of beauty to some extent with other animals: “Whether we can or not give any reason for the pleasure thus derived from vision and hearing, yet man and many of the lower animals are alike pleased by the same colours, graceful shading and forms, and the same sounds.” More about that later. Darwin acknowledged the importance of female choice and the preferences involved, but he did not speculate much about how these preferences evolve. I will briefly discuss what could  be called three classes of explanations for the evolution of female preferences and corresponding male display traits. There is good genes selection, Fisher's runaway sexual selection and a more recent group of hypotheses around sensory biases, like sensory exploitation hypothesis. Good genes and Fisherian runaway have been elaborately used to address the evolution of aesthetic and artistic expression in humans. But, as far as I know,  sensory biases and sensory exploitation hypothesis haven't, although they offer promising possibilities. This might be due to the fact that research in this line of thinking is only recently being conducted. However, hypotheses concerning sensory bias are gaining influence in sexual selection thinking as empirical evidence is being accumulated that indeed many display traits evolved as consequences of sensory biases (see below). These hypotheses differ from traditional explanations in the assumption that female preferences pre-exist and are subsequently exploited by males, whereas in good genes and Fisher's runaway female preferences are considered a consequence instead of a cause of male display traits (in exceptional cases sex role reversal causes males to choose and females to display, and also mutual selection exists). To contrast sensory exploitation with good genes and Fisherian runaway I will first review these models of sexual selection. Next, I will combine sensory exploitation hypothesis with the dual inheritance system developed by Boyd and Richerson (1985), to model the evolution of art within the darwinian paradigm and compare it to previous models based on sexual selection mechanisms. Finally, I will show how this 'cultural sensory exploitation model' could work by applying it to address the conundrum of the creative explosion, the abrupt burst of elaborate art during the Middle to Upper Paleolithic transition some 50,000 years ago (YA).


SENSORY EXPLOITATION, MIMICRY AND SEXUAL SELECTION

Good genes selection hypothesis (sometimes called fitness indicator theory) simply states that females choose partners based on indicators of genetic quality (Andersson, 1994). The evolutionary logic behind this behavior is that they as such provide their offspring with good genes. Choosing good genes positively influences the viability of the offspring and increases the chances that the female's offspring reaches reproductive age. So female choice for indicator traits is indirectly selected by back riding on the directly naturally selected good genes (Ryan, 1998). Closely related to good genes hypothesis is the handicap principle. It predicts the game-theoretic constraint that indicators must be costly to be reliable because if not they can be faked too easily (Zahavi, 1975, 1991, 1997).

In Fisher's (1930) runaway process female preferences and male traits become genetically correlated and as such get caught in  a self-enforcing feedback loop. Suppose that mate preferences vary somewhat randomly within a bird population, so that in a particular generation, some females happen to prefer long tails on males, while others don't care. Suppose male tail length also varies randomly. Females that prefer to mate with long-tailed males will mate with such males more often than females that prefer short-tailed males. Following mating and genetic recombination, the genes for long-tail preference and the genes for the long tail itself will become correlated: an individual carrying a gene for long tails will tend to carry a gene for the corresponding preference (Kirkpatrick, 1987, pp 74-75). In this way a 'momentum' is created conferred by genetic linkage and the risk to individuals of failing to display exaggerated traits or choosy preferences given that momentum (Miller, 1998). The peacock's tail grows longer and longer because of a despotic treadmill of fashion: “Each peahen is on a treadmill and dare not jump off lest she condemn her sons to celibacy” (Ridley, 1993, p 135), as is predicted by the sexy son hypothesis (Weatherhead & Robertson, 1979). So long as the process is unchecked by severe counterselection (i.e. survival costs), it will advance with ever-increasing speed (Fisher, 1930).

Whenever studying a biological trait within the darwinian framework it is important to distinguish between the selective forces that led to its origin, its evolution and the processes that maintain it (Fisher, 1930). Both good genes and Fisherian runaway cannot explain the origin of a female preference for a male display trait, they only model its subsequent evolution and maintenance  - in the same line of thinking I will argue below they cannot explain the origin of art and aesthetics in humans. Sensory exploitation hypothesis on the other hand does provide an explanation for the initial origin of female preferences. Moreover, it may even predict evolution and maintenance of human art behavior.

In both good genes and Fisherian runaway it is assumed female preferences evolve because they are genetically linked with male traits. This is not assumed in sensory bias hypotheses. Many biologists suggest that female sexual preferences may in fact be maintained or at least originate as, or be influenced by, 'receiver biases' or 'sensory biases' that evolve under selection outside the sexual context (e.g. Darwin 1859; Williams 1966; Sober 1984; West- Eberhard 1984, 1992; Ryan 1990, 1995, 1998; Ryan & Rand 1990, 1993; Ryan & Keddy-Hector 1992; Endler, 1992; Arak & Enquist 1993, 1995; Shaw 1995; Dawkins & Guilford 1996; Endler & Basolo 1998; Autumn et al. 2002 ). Although this basic view is shared among these researchers, they differ in their focus. For example, Ryan and colleagues (Ryan 1990, Ryan and Rand 1990, 1993; Ryan et al 1990) focus on the effect of sense organ response thresholds, while Guilford and Dawkins (1991) argue that properties of a receiver's 'psychological landscape' influence signal design. Different terminologies are used for somewhat similar concepts, like sensory exploitation (e.g. Ryan, 1990, 1998), sensory trap (e.g. Christy, 1995) and sensory drive (e.g. Endler, 1992). Also an important historical view is shared. Because of phenotypic evolution, the sensory-response systems of receivers of new signals will already have characteristics that affect which new signal designs are effective. Signals that 'manipulate' (West-Eberhard 1984) or 'exploit' (Ryan, 1990, 1998) these preexisting characteristics will be favored. These exploitative signals are produced by males because it increases their reproductive success, possibly at a cost to the female by disturbing her reproductive strategy and the function for which the bias evolved in the first place (Arnqvist, 2006).

Overviews show a diversity of cases of female receiver biases in different species suggesting it may well be a widespread and important influence on the evolution of signaling systems  (e.g. Rodriguez & Snedden, 2004; Arnqvist, 2006). Herein cited studies illustrate there are many possible origins for preexisting biases exploited by males in a sexual context. Biases can be maintained by selection to find food or to avoid becoming food, or they may originate from mating preferences in the evolutionary past of the species, they may also originate from engineering limitations of the sensory system itself (Ryan, 1998), to name most important. 

Researchers differ in the extent of the influence they attribute receiver biases to have on sexual signaling, varying from some minor influence on mating preferences to entire maintenance of the preference, this means without any selection or maintenance in the sexual context. The latter possibility is defended by Ryan (1998) who suggests female preferences could be maintained solely by selection in other contexts indeed. Ryan (1998) suggests some male display traits evolve without being genetically correlated to female preferences (as assumed in good genes and Fisherian runaway) by exploiting these preexisting biases, hence 'sensory exploitation hypothesis.' This claim implies sensory exploitation hypothesis as being a distinct alternative to good genes and Fisherian runaway, with ability to replace them, at the least in some cases, as an explanation for the evolution of certain sexual characteristics. This possibility is however still under debate (e.g. Fuller et al, 2005). Nevertheless some cases indeed almost unambiguously point in this direction. For instance, the Amazon molly (Poecilia formosa), an all-female species of poeciliid fish, uses sperm from males of other species to reproduce successfully, but the male's genes are not incorporated in the offspring's genome. Individuals exhibit the same preferences for body size as females of their two sexual, parental species despite the lack of any direct benefits from mate choice and the impossibility of genetic correlations of male traits and preferences needed for runaway or good genes selection (Ryan, 1998). Another fact that supports this view is the existence of unambiguous biological mimicry in sexual contexts.  A mimicry system is an ecological set-up that includes two or more protagonists, performing three roles: being a model, being a mimic, or being a dupe. In organismic mimicry systems a model is a living or material agent emitting perceptible stimuli or signals; a mimic is an animal or plant that plagiarizes the model; and a dupe (also called the receiver) is an animal enemy or victim of the mimic whose senses are perceptive to the model's signals and which is thus 'deceived' by the mimic's similar signals (Pasteur, 1982). Some male insects (receivers), for example, pollinate orchids that have flower parts resembling female insects (mimic). The male's attraction to the flower is not favored by selection, but is a receiver bias that results from the selective advantage of responding to real conspecific females (model) (Ryan, 1998; Jersakova et al, 2006). It is clear that in this case the flower's sexual signals evolved without any genetic correlation with the insect receiver. In fact, in any situation where selection of a female preference is maintained by selection in another context and this preference is exploited by the male in the sexual context, the male could be called the mimic, and the source of selection (food, predator, ...) the model, the female being the receiver (dupe) (Christy, 1995). 

I will now discuss a specific case of sexual mimicry in some more detail because I will use its mechanistic basis to model the evolution of human art. Many cichlid species independently evolved mouthbreeding as a highly specialized brood care behavior. Egg dummies, resembling the ova of the corresponding species, formed of various parts of the body can be found in different lineages of mouthbreeding cichlids. Most abundant are egg spots, which are conspicuously yellow spots developed on the anal fin of males. Females of mouthbreeding cichlids undoubtedly evolved sensory capabilities to detect eggs and are supposed to have a strong affinity for them, because they pick them up immediately after spawning. In fact, the ability to detect the eggs directly affects the female's fertility. Every missed egg results in a reduction in fitness. Consequently, a pre-existing sensory bias might have occurred in early mouthbreeders and might still occur in mouthbreeding species without egg dummies. As a consequence, males would have evolved egg spots in response to this sensory bias. After the female (receiver) has picked up her eggs (model), the male displays in front of her showing the egg spots on his anal fin (mimic). She 'thinks' she sees an egg on its fin, so tries to vacuum it up in her mouth – and get a mouthful of sperm from the canny male in the process. The females' mating preference for a male with well-elaborated egg spots would not yield in any benefits for the females, but the female's preference is solely maintained by the benefit of the detection of eggs after spawning (Tobler, 2006). Thus, if correct, this is a clear case of sensory exploitation. What might be relevant about it for the evolution of human art is that it shows ordinary selection can produce 2-dimensional representations (the egg spots) on a surface (the anal fin of the male) of 3D objects (the eggs). Below I will apply its mechanistic basis to model the evolution of human art. There I will also present a categorization of possible human sensory biases. 





PREVIOUS DARWINIAN MODELS OF THE EVOLUTION OF ART

First, I will briefly review the good genes model and the cultural Fisherian runaway model, previously proposed to explain the evolution of human art and aesthetics. Although Darwinian, both approaches use a quite different conceptual framework. Next, I will use some of the concepts developed by the authors of the cultural runaway hypothesis to construct a model for the evolution of art based on sensory exploitation hypothesis, which I call cultural sensory exploitation hypothesis. Finally, I will use this hypothesis to address the conundrum of the creative explosion and the sudden emergence of elaborated cave paintings. As shown above, the explanatory power of sensory exploitation is especially apparent concerning the origin of female preferences and corresponding male display traits, as good genes and runaway models cannot address the problem of origin. Analogously, I will argue cultural sensory exploitation may provide a more accurate  explanation for the origin of human art and aesthetic than good genes and cultural runaway. Further, all three models can explain, at least in theory, subsequent evolution and maintenance of female preferences and male display traits. Again analogously, I will argue that cultural sensory exploitation offers an alternative or at least additional explanation to the evolution and maintenance of human art behavior and aesthetics. It is important to notice that only Miller's good genes or fitness indicator hypothesis (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001) predicts art is sexually selected, in Boyd and Richerson's cultural runaway (1985) and my cultural sensory exploitation the mechanisms of the sexual models, Fisherian runaway and sensory exploitation, are instead applied to the cultural level.


Good genes selection for art 

Several authors have used the theory of good genes selection to explain art from the perspective of evolutionary psychology (overview see Miller, 1998). Evolutionary psychologist Miller (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001) probably elaborated most on this line of thinking. As discussed, in good genes selection it is  asserted male display traits evolved as indicators of fitness. Miller assumes a human work of art functions as a male display trait. An artist displays his heritable virtuosity, his creativity, his intelligence and so on in his work as indicators of his genetic fitness. In this reasoning, the evolution of art is driven by the reproductive benefits of high fitness males. The artwork thus functions according to Miller as an 'extended phenotype' (Miller, 2001), meaning that although it is an artefact it is genetically determined (like spider webs and beaver dams are) (Dawkins, 1982). I believe this to be a problematic assumption (or statement). Although Miller's hypothesis might be an appealing attempt to unite evolutionary theory with the reality of human art,  it encounters some  problems, both empirical and theoretical. As pointed out above, good genes selection hypothesis cannot explain the origin of female preference and male sex traits. As Miller considers an art work to be a male display trait, good genes cannot explain its origin. It could though explain its maintenance through sexual selection, at least in principle. But even if female choice for indicators of male fitness has some influence on the maintenance of art behavior in our evolutionary past it seems very unlikely it would be a fundamental force acting on the evolution of art as  empirical evidence does not seem to fit this prediction. First, art is not only produced by men of reproductive age but also by children and women (also past reproductive age) in human societies across time and around the world. In some societies they even are the most important art producers (Dissanayake, 2001). Second, also Miller's hypothesis does not fit the fact art is often created in group and functions socially in premodern societies (Dissanayake, 2001). Apart from observations of human artistic expression that do not seem to fit Miller's sexual model, there may be some objections concerning the conceptual framework he used (see below). Boyd and Richerson's conceptual framework of dual inheritance (1985) may predict human evolution, including the evolution of art, more accurately.


Aesthetics as a consequence of a Fisherian cultural runaway process 

Boyd and Richerson (1985, chapter 8) developed a model in which they applied Fisher's runaway to the cultural level to explain the evolution of symbols (like icons), aesthetics and art. As said they differ from Miller's approach to human evolution in the conceptual framework they use. Evolutionary psychologists like Miller follow what could be called the standard sociobiology paradigm, in which only two concepts are considered fundamental: genes and the environment. The genes are considered the 'recipe' and the environment the 'ingredients'; both are necessary and complementary to create a meal. It implies phenotypic traits can only be inherited genetically. Thus, it is assumed even if environment is important, fundamentally, evolution will only occur as genefrequencies change. Within this framework culture is considered to be of minor evolutionary importance, it is on the leash of genes  and opinions within sociobiology would only differ on the length of the leash (Lumsden & Wilson, 1981).  But in Boyd & Richerson's (1985) framework, culture also is one of the fundamental factors in human evolution, apart from the genetic system and the environment. The first dynamic models of gene-culture coevolution were published by geneticists Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza (1976). After that, Boyd and Richerson (1985)  were the first to develop a system, they called dual inheritance, in which cultural inheritance plays a  role at least as important as genetic inheritance. Dual Inheritance Theory (DIT) models culture as 'inherited', just like genes are inherited. But how does this work as we know acquired variation cannot be genetically transmitted – referred to as the Weismann barrier (Weismann, 1893)? The solution is that culture is transmitted via an alternative inheritance system. The definition of culture used in DIT makes this clear: 

“Culture is information capable of affecting individuals' phenotypes which they acquire from other conspecifics by social learning (teaching or imitation).”

Thus, culture is inherited or transmitted through social learning. The more social learning plays a role in human evolution the more accurate DIT is compared to hypotheses that do not take cultural transmission into account. Recently, more and more researchers are considering DIT a plausible alternative, believing social learning does play a major role in human evolution. Boyd and Richerson (2005) consider culture to be part of human biology: culture is an adaptation to a rapid changing environment, one which also enabled humans to populate many different biotopes even as hunter-gatherers (2005). Note that, although DIT's focus on culture, it does not deviate from the darwinian paradigm and the assumption of natural origins (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). I will argue that DIT proves especially useful as a conceptual framework when addressing the question of the evolution of art. So, as said, I will use DIT in combination with sensory exploitation hypothesis to this end. But first I will discuss Boyd and Richerson's runaway model (1985) on the evolution of aesthetics and the role of art. 

Within DIT several forces are perceieved that bias cultural transmission and as such cause culture to evolve. It is postulated these selective forces result from the adaptive outcome they create. One of these forces is 'indirect bias' (Boyd & Richerson, 1985, chapter 8) How does it work? Naive individuals acquire adaptive cultural information by imitating conspecifics, the models. It is a useful rule of thumb to imitate successful individuals because obviously they provide the highest chance of acquiring adaptive information. To estimate the success of a potential model the naive individual uses an indicator. An indicator of success could be money in the bank or number of children, ... . Naive individuals will prefer a certain value of the indicator trait, this is the preference trait. This could be more is better, like it may be in the case of money, but the preference may also be for an intermediate value of the indicator trait: in most western societies today an intermediate number of two children is preferred over none or a lot. Because it is very difficult and costly to evaluate the relative merit of different cultural variants, it may be adaptive to adopt the variants used by successful people (Flinn & Alexander, 1982). So a naive individual may tend to imitate everything that is plausibly connected with the success of the model. This leads to the following: Individuals' values of the indicator trait may affect their importance in the cultural transmission of other characters, the indirectly biased traits. This system of indicator trait and preference trait can, under certain conditions, be caught in a runaway process.  Just like in the sexual runaway process where tail size (indicator) and preference for large tails become genetically correlated, indicator trait and preference trait become correlated through cultural transmission. This happens because if a naive individual imitates a successful individual it also imitates indirectly its preference trait. The preference trait is as such indirectly biased. Again a self-enforcing feedback loop between indicator and preference can cause the indicator trait which was initially an adaptive sign of success to become exaggerated following its own internal logic. “This logic will, however, have more in common with esthetic than functional design. Much as peacock tails and bowerbird houses are thought to result from runaway sexual selection, the indirect bias runaway process will generate traits with an exaggerated, interrelated, aesthetically pleasing but afunctional form.  The functional forces may thus constitute merely a range of tolerance in the exploitation of the environment or the satisfaction of biological requirements beyond which the system as constituted can no longer function – is 'selected against'” (Boyd and Richerson, 1985, 278).

Finally they argue why there cultural runaway fits human behavior better than its genetic analog:
“Notice that in the case of the cultural runaway process colorful displays are not as likely to be limited to the male sex as they are with the genetic analog. A prestigious male or female can have an unlimited number of cultural offspring by non-parental transmission, whereas in the genetic case only males can take advantage of multiple matings to increase their fitness enough to compensate for costly displays. The fact that women as well as men participate in elaborate symbolic behaviors is more consistent with a cultural then with a genetic runaway explanation” (Boyd and Richerson, 1985, pp 278-279). 

Although this runaway model offers interesting perspectives on the evolution of artistic expression, symbols and aesthetics, I believe a much simpler and more basic logic needs to be explored. I believe this logic is provided by the sensory exploitation hypothesis. I will however adopt some of the concepts proposed by Boyd and Richerson, like dual inheritance, to apply sensory exploitation to the evolution of human art. 


CULTURAL SENSORY EXPLOITATION HYPOTHESIS






If art evolved from exploiting pre-existing sensory biases we of course need to know what these exploited biases in humans are. Analogously to the sexual selection cases they typically should originate from being currently maintained by selection in other contexts or from being 'ghosts of selection past', or possibly, from limitations of the human sensory system due to engineering details. Note that if human sensory biases are considered within the dual inheritance system, they include any biases the sensory system may exhibit, including culturally determined ones. The sensory system includes the senses (included feeling through the body) and the brain, its structure (neural system) as well as its content (receiver psychology, cultural information). Let's consider three broad categories of determinants of human sensory biases: cognition, emotions and the senses. 

Humans have big brains in proportion to their body compared to other animals. Human brains account for more than 16% of the basal metabolism which is a lot compared to the 3% average of other mammals, which in its turn is a lot compared to non-mammal animals. This means, cognition, internal neural processing of information, probably plays a more important role in humans than in any other species. Our big brains may well be a consequence of gene-culture coevolution - “culture is as much a consequence as a cause of our innate psychology” (Boyd & Richerson, 2005): we need big brains to store and process vast amounts of adaptive cultural information compared to other animals whose behavior is proportionally more genetically determined. How does this affect the nature of human sensory biases? Within the limitations imposed by natural selection considerable cultural variation in human sensory biases might exist, expressed in the  variety in artistic and aesthetic tastes around the globe among and within cultures. Genetically, brains of all human populations are the same but the content is not: they are filled with differing cultural variants. Cultures and subcultures differ in there beliefs, traditions, opinions and so on about the world. But this fact poses no problem to a darwinian approach to art: even if sensory biases exploited by art are largely based in social learning, they sure have a mechanistic basis and dual inheritance provides a fruitful framework to find its basis. Cognitive capacities however are universal among humans. As an example, problem solving may be one of the most influential cognitive abilities subject to exploitation via art. When humans are confronted with a problem they show a natural inclination to think about it and try to solve it possibly even if its solution does not serve any direct benefits. They seem to be challenged by the problem itself. The cause of this natural tendency to solve problems is evident: it often results in very adaptive outcomes. But this does not exclude it from exploitation, meaning being triggered in a situation where it does not necessarily offers direct benefits. I think art might create such situations. For instance art must have posed from its initial origins the problem of the tension between a real object and its artistic representation, between a fictional and the real world, between model and mimic. On the practical level this tension might express itself in the question: 'How is this illusion created?' This refers to the magical shamanistic functions the first visual art is believed to serve (e.g. Lewis-Williams,  1996). But, apart from some universal cognitive tendencies, our cognitive abilities that make acquiring culture possible (teaching, imitation, observation) cause sensory biases to be influenced by the cultural variants present in the population determining beliefs, opinions, traditions and so on. Below I will discuss the role of cultural inheritance on the evolution of art. 

Emotions on the other hand are less subject to cultural variation. they are considered important biological functional systems in human (and other) behavior, which were selected for by natural selection in our evolutionary past (Nelissen, 2004).  Basic emotions - fear, joy, sadness, anger, surprise and disgust - are universal  in humans and most do not exhibit much cultural variation. Also facial expression of emotions are universal in humans (Ekman, 1969, 1982, 1994). Basic emotions are not only the same in all humans, but indeed they are very old in evolutionary terms (Nelissen, 2004). Fear for instance is a very old one, it may the oldest one ever evolved in vertebrates (Nelissen, 1978: it exists even in fish) and as such it can be expected to be mainly genetically inherited. Emotions are comparable to reflexes, they offer immediate adaptive solutions to survival problems, which can be later cognitively processed. Emotions are unconscious, we do not feel them. But they can cause feelings, which are conscious perceptions of emotions (Nelissen, 2004). When we perceive the emotional reaction of fear for instance we may become afraid. As a consequence feelings are much more subject to cultural variation. Analogously to the sexual selection cases these automatic emotional reactions could be exploited by art. Because they are unconscious art can serve as a 'sensory trap' outside human conscious perception. Our attention is drawn and we cannot describe why. I suppose basic emotions to be very susceptible to exploitation through art and as such can be considered as clear sources of human sensory biases in art contexts (see also Dissanayake, 2006). It is agreed that innate traits almost always undergo interaction with cultural inherited variants, Boyd and Richerson's gene- culture coevolution model suggests this is going on possibly already for million years of hominid evolution. Culture can sometimes even be a more fundamental factor than genes, “cultural traits which affect mating preference could affect genetic evolution through the action of sexual selection. In effect, the human genome could be “domesticated” by culturally transmitted traits” (Boyd & Richerson, 1985, p 277). So we would expect sensory biases to evolve quickly in cultures that undergo a lot of changes. This seems to be exactly the case for western culture and art at the moment. Experiments of art appreciation combining registration of unconscious emotional reactions (for instance with skin conductivity tests) with polls of opinions and beliefs about the quality of the artworks could provide insight in the complex interaction between genetically and culturally inherited variants determining human sensory biases. 

The anatomical and physiological limitations of the senses and the neural system also play an important role in the processing of visual signals.  Artificial neural networks have shown that receivers trained to recognize simple, arbitrary visual patterns show incidental biases for exaggerated and symmetric patterns (Ryan, 1998). This suggests preferences for traits that are believed to be linked to aesthetics like exaggeration (in color for instance) and symmetry could emerge incidentally from the visual processing itself. Although Darwin (1871, p 302) acknowledged  “[the taste for the beautiful] differs widely in the different races of man, and is not quite the same even in the different nations of the same race,” he also argued, somewhat contradictory to the above, that the nerve cells of the brain in the highest as well in the lowest members of the vertebrate series are derived from a common progenitor and that this is reflected in the fact that the beauty of males as consequence of the high taste of female animals generally coincides with our own standards of beauty (Darwin, 1871, p 595). Whether or not our standards of beauty are derived from it, similarities in sensory processing of visual information may be reflected in the following cross species comparison. 

Let's revert to the case of the egg spots. Because they are mimics of eggs they must - at least originally - have evolved through sensory biases of females. The in terms of mimicry most developed egg-spots, “true haplochromine-like egg-spots,” are characterized by an inner yellow or orange ring and an outer transparent and colorless ring (e.g. Wickler, 1962). The inner yellow ring mimics the yolk in the egg. It is conspicuous that this '2D representation of an egg' shows some similarities to 2D representations made by humans. Compared for instance to the first cave paintings we see both have a clear contour line (transparent in the egg spots, black in the cave art) and both represent of course a real object. Some modern artworks, like some of Picasso's paintings show the same elements. This contour line may reflect some shared basic principle involved in the processing of visual information. Be this as it may, the genetic selection process that led to the egg spot can be used as an analog for the evolution of artistic representation.


The mechanistic basis of the evolution of art and “The Creative Explosion”

We know why and how the egg spots have evolved: the egg spots have been proved to be a genetic trait that provides a selective advantage because they encourage females to participate in oral mating (Salzburger et al., 2007). But as discussed above human art does not seem to originate from direct genetic changes. As such, it cannot be considered merely a genetically determined extended phenotype. Instead I suggest art and aesthetics result from exploitation of human sensory biases via culturally transmitted information.  I will discuss this assumption by applying it to what is known as The Creative Explosion, the sudden appearance of elaborate art during the Middle To Upper Paleolithic transition. 

In the discussion whether art is biological or cultural I follow Boyd and Richerson's (1985, 2005) view that culture is an essential part of human biology and as such the dichotomy nurture/nature is misleading. Here I will respect that interwoven aspect of human biology. There is the long held view that the first art came into existence rather abruptly somewhere between 50,000 and 40,000 YA, during the Middle to Upper Paleolithic transition (e.g. Klein, 2000). Some researchers, though, recently claimed art's origins would lay further back in time to even 250,000 YA (e.g. McBrearty & Brooks, 2000). Nevertheless, whenever the first artistic artifacts were produced, the notion of a creative explosion holds because clearly a qualitative and quantitative threshold was crossed (Appenzeller, 1998):  Human and animal figurines, decorated and carved bone, antler, ivory and stone objects, and abstract and representational images, either painted or engraved, began to appear abundantly in caves, rockshelters, and exposed rocky surfaces by 36,000 YA (e.g. Marshack, 1972; Conkey et al., 1997; Bar-Yosef, 2002). 

It remains a conundrum why only then and not earlier these more elaborate artistic expressions appeared (Balter, 1999). My hypothesis of cultural sensory exploitation may provide some insight here. Humans are agreed to have undergone no truly significant organic modifications (no further brain expansion for instance) since Homo sapiens evolved some 200,000 YA. So the first humans possessed the same cognitive abilities and presumably also the same sensory biases (culturally determined variation not included) as humans from 40,000 YA ago had. So potentially the first humans were exploitable by all kind of stimulating elaborate artworks (imagine the reaction of one of them after being teleported into a contemporaneous movie theater playing King Kong), but somehow they did not produce an artistic tradition. I suggest the reason is they couldn't. Not because they wouldn't nor because they weren't smart enough, but because some crucial demographic and cultural changes had to take place first; which only did some 50,000 YA. 

Artistic expression involves social learning. Without teaching, imitation and observation of others an individual will not acquire the skills and other innovations necessary to produce for instance a cave painting like the ones created some 40,000 YA. True, there must be someone who was the first to invent a particular relevant skill, but without incorporation into the cultural repertoire via cultural transmission, acquired skills will not be retained, nor be further improved over the generations. Empirical evidence from different research fields support this relation between the number and complexity of innovations in a population and social learning. First, there is strong evidence that the size of the interacting pool of social learners, the 'effective population size' (Henrich, 2004), determines whether  innovations will be maintained. You would expect high sociability to positively influence effective population size, which in turn increases number of innovations maintained.  This is demonstrated by empirical studies on primates. The incidence of customary tool use is greater in more sociable populations of wild orangutans and chimpanzees (e.g. van Schaik & Knott, 2001). Sociable gregariousness is far more likely to produce the maintenance of invented skills in a population of orangutans than solitary life, where the mother is the only accessible expert (van Schaik & Pradhana, 2003). Second, humans are capable of cumulative culture, meaning building 'new' innovations on previous innovations maintained by cultural transmission generation after generation, hereby creating and preserving more complex innovations. In humans also maintenance of innovations appears to depend on effective population size. A combination of archeological and ethnohistorical evidence indicates that, over an approximately 8,000-year period, from the beginning of the Holocene until European explorers began arriving in the eighteenth century, the societies of Tasmania lost a series of valuable skills and technologies. It is suggested that the relatively sudden reduction in the effective population size that occurred with the rising ocean levels at the end of the last glacial epoch, which cut Tasmania off from the rest of Australia for the ten ensuing millennia, could have initiated a cultural evolutionary process that produced an increasing deterioration of more complex skills leading to the complete disappearance of some technologies and practices (Diamond, 1978; Jones, 1995; Henrich, 2004).

So, if it can be shown that some crucial changes went on that positively affected effective population sizes during or some time prior to the creative explosion, it could explain why it actually took place. I thus suggest there were all these preexisting human sensory biases and quite abruptly effective population size reached a threshold that made way for exploitation of these biases because some innovations, necessary to develop art, were maintained in function of this exploitation. There are several indications that the the Middle to Upper Paleolithic transition is indeed associated with an increase in effective population size. First, it is suggested that the transition is associated with the flowering of long distant contacts as is evidenced by  the rarity of exotic materials, such as marine shells and flint from distant sources, in Middle Paleolithic levels, while such materials are more frequent in Upper Paleolithic contexts (e.g. White 1982). Further, some crucial demographic changes took place, micropopulations became larger and often denser on the landscapes, more connected via cooperative ties and Upper Paleolithic groups developed higher tendencies of colonization (Stiner & Kuhn, 2006). Next to an increase in corporate solidarity (e.g.  Conkey, 1978; White, 1982; Gilman, 1984), the transition is also associated with an increase in group cohesion and social intensification (Shennan, 2001). Last but not least numerous researchers suggest an overall population increase took place during the late middle paleolithic (Bar-Yosef, 2002). Thus, all these indications suggest an increase in effective population size is in effect associated with the creative explosion. I suggest  the effective population size reached a threshold which made maintenance of innovations possible that are necessary for elaborate art production. Which innovations were maintained by cultural transmission - and why they were maintained- are the next questions to be addressed. 

Imagine: an early human stumbles upon a stone and starts scratching at it with a harder stone, deepening its natural crevices, resulting in something that looks like a figure. I assume this initial spark of artistic behavior would originate from self-exploitation of sensory biases. Every artist knows that she/he is the first one on which the 'effectiveness' of an artwork is tested. Not only when 'finished' but also during the several intermediate stages in the artistic process. I think effectiveness of an art work is not the same as pleasing through aesthetics. I assume art evolved to (self)exploit our attention, whether this is by pleasing signals or not is of no importance to its evolution. Triggering basic emotions like fear or anger (see above) can do the job as well. Self-exploitation through sensory biases via extra-corporal artifacts would not be a uniquely human behavior. In fact it is described in fiddler crabs (Uca terpsichores). Courting male fiddler crabs sometimes build mounds of sand called hoods at the entrances to their burrows. Males wave their single enlarged claws to attract females to their burrows for mating. It was shown that burrows with hoods are more attractive to females and that females visually orient to these structures. Interestingly, a recent study showed that males themselves where also attracted towards there own hoods. This can be explained by the mechanism of sensory trap (i.e. sensory exploitation) (Ribeiro, 2006). In humans, we can assume most sensory biases (except sexual dimorphic ones) are shared by males and females. If an early human produces something that appeals to her/his own sensory biases it most likely also appeals to that of others. But if there are not enough conspecifics around to observe and imitate the innovative behavior that led to these supposed first artistic attempts, it will not be incorporated into the cultural repertoire and it will get lost, as follows from the principle of effective population size. Possibly such isolated incidents occurred several times prior to the creative explosion. Notice, however, that in reality the process could have been much more gradual than I present it in this hypothetical example - as suggested by the use of decorative beads and pigments prior to the creative explosion - but the basic idea remains the same. From the moment that the effective population  of social learners was large enough to maintain innovative art behavior, an art tradition like the one of which the cave art of 40,000 YA is presumably the first elaborated one, could emerge. 












Andersson, M. (1994). Sexual Selection. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 

Appenzeller, T. (1998). Art: Evolution or Revolution? Science 20:Vol. 282. no. 5393, p. 1451.

Arak, A. & Enquist, M. (1993). Hidden preferences and the evolution of signals. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, 340, 207-213. 

Arak, A. & Enquist, M. (1995). Conflict, receiver bias and the evolution of signal form. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, 349, 337-344. 

Arnqvist, G. (2006). Sensory exploitation and sexual conflict. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B, 361, 375–386.

Autumn, K., Ryan, M. J. & Wake, D. B. (2002). Integrating historical and mechanistic biology enhances the study of adaptation. Quarterly Review of Biology, 77, 383-408. 

Balter, M. (1999). New Light on the Oldest Art. Science Feb 12 1999: 920-922.
 
Bar-Yosef, O. (2002). The Upper Paleolithic Revolution. Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 2002. 31:363-93. 

Boyd, R. & Richerson, P.J. (1985). Culture and the Evolutionary Process. The University of Chicago Press.

Boyd, R. & Richerson, P.J. (2005). The origin and evolution of cultures. The University of Chicago Press.

Christy, J.H. (1995). Mimicry, Mate choice, and the Sensory Trap hypothesis. American Naturalist, 146, 171-181.

Conkey, M.W. (1978). Style and information in cultural evolution: toward a predictive model for the Palaeolithic. In Social Archaeology: Beyond Subsistence and Dating, ed. CL Redman et al., 61-85, New York: Academic.

Conkey, M.W., Soffer, O., Stratmann, D., Jablonski, N.G. (1997). Beyond Art: Pleistocene Image and Symbol. San Francisco: Calif. Acad. Sci. 

Diamond, J. (1978). The Tasmanians: The longest Isolation, the Simplest Technology. Nature 273: 185-186.

Diamond, Jared (2005). Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed.

Darwin, C. (1859). On the Origin of Species. [A facsimile of the first edition 1998.]. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 

Darwin, C.  (1871).  The descent of man,  and selection in relation  to sex (2 vols.).   London: John Murray.   (Reprinted in 1952 by Encyclopedia Brittanica)

Dawkins, R. (1982).  The extended phenotype: The gene as the unit of selection.  Oxford, U.K.: W. H. Freeman.

Dawkins, M. S. & Guilford, T. (1996). Sensory bias and the adaptiveness of female choice. American Naturalist, 148, 937-942. 

Dissanayake, E. (2001). Birth of the Arts. Natural History, Vol. 109, Issue 10.

Dissanayake, E. (2006). Ritual and ritualization: musical means of conveying and shaping emotion in humans and other animals, in Steven Brown & Ulrik Volgsten (eds.), Music and Manipulation: On the Social Uses and Social Control of Music. Oxford: Berghahn, pp. 31-57.

Ekman, P. & Friesen, W. V. (1969). The repertoire of nonverbal behavior: Categories, origins, usage, and encoding. Semiotica, 1, 49–98.

Ekman, P. (1982). Emotions in the human face. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

Ekman, P. (1994). Strong evidence for universals in human facial expressions. Psychological Bulletin, 115: 268-287.

Endler, J.A. (1992). Signals, signal conditions, and the direction of evolution. American Naturalist, 139, S125-S153. 

Endler, J. A. & Basolo, A. L. 1998. Sensory ecology, receiver biases and sexual selection. Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 13, 415-420. 

Feldman, M. & Cavalli-Sforza L. (1976). Cultural and biological evolutionary processes, selection for a trait under complex transmission. Theoretical Population Biology, 9:238-59.

Fisher, R. A. (1930). The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. Clarendon Press. Oxford. cilia reticulata). Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. 17, 199-205. 

Flinn, M.V., & Alexander, R.D. (1982). Culture theory: The developing synthesis from biology. Hum. Ecol. 10: 383-400.

Fuller R.C., Houle D., & Travis J. (2005). Sensory Bias as an Explanation for the Evolution of Mate Preferences.  American Naturalist, 166, 437-446.

Gilman A (1984). Explaining the Upper Palaeolithic revolution. In Marxist Perspectives in Archaeology, ed. E Springs, 220-237. Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.

Guilford, T., & Dawkins, M.S. (1991). Receiver psychology and the evolution of animal signals. Animal Behavior, 42, 1-14.

Henrich, J. (2004). Demography and Cultural Evolution: How Adaptive Cultural Processes can
Produce Maladaptive Losses: The Tasmanian Case. American Antiquity, Vol. 69, No. 2., pp. 197-214.
 
Jersakova, J., Johnson, S.D., & Kindlmann, P. (2006). Mechanisms and evolution of deceptive 
pollination in orchids. Biol. Rev., 81, 219–235. 

Jones, R. (1995). Tasmanian Archeology: Establishing the Sequence. Annual Review of Anthropology 24: 423-446.

Kirkpatrick, M. (1987). The evolutionary forces acting on female preferences in polygynous animals. In Bradbury, J. W., & Andersson, M. B. (Eds.), Sexual selection: Testing the alternatives (pp. 67-82). New York: John Wiley.  

Klein, R. (2000). Archaeology and the evolution of human behavior. Evolutionary Anthropology, 9, 17–36. 

Lewis-Williams, J.D., 1996. Harnessing the brain: vision and shamanism in Upper Palaeolithic Western Europe. In: M.W. Conkey, O. Sopher, D. Stratmann and N.G. Jablonski (Editors), Beyond art: Pleistocene image and symbol. University of California Press, Berkeley, pp. 321-342.

Lumsden, C., & Wilson, E. (1981). Genes, mind, and culture: The coevolutionary process. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press.

Marshack, A. (1972). The Roots of Civilization; The Cognitive Beginnings of Man's First Art, Symbol, and Notation. New York: McGrawHill. 413 pp. 

McBrearty, S. and Brooks, A.S. (2000). The revolution that wasn’t: a new interpretation of the origin of  modern human behavior. Journal of Human Evolution, 39, 453–563. 

Miller, G.F. (1998). How mate choice shaped human nature: A review of sexual selection and human evolution. In C. Crawford & D. Krebs (Eds.), Handbook of evolutionary psychology: Ideas, issues, and applications. Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 87-129. 

Miller, G.F. (1999). Sexual selection for cultural displays. In R. Dunbar, C. Knight, & C. Power (Eds.), The evolution of culture. Edinburgh U. Press, pp. 71-91.

Miller, G.F. (2000). The Mating Mind. London: Heinemann. 

Miller, G.F. (2001). Aesthetic fitness: How sexual selection shaped artistic virtuosity as a fitness indicator and aesthetic preferences as mate choice criteria. Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts 1, special issue on Evolution, creativity, and art.

Nelissen, M. (1978). Sound production by some Tanganyikan cichlid fishes and a hypothesis for the evolution of their communication mechanisms. Behaviour, 64: 137-147.

Nelissen, M. (2004). Emoties en de evolutie naar socialiteit (Emotions and the evolution towards sociality). In: Nelissen M (ed). Waarom we willen wat we willen. Uitgeverij Lannoo, Tielt, 125-154.

Pasteur, G. (1982). A classificatory review of mimicry systems. Ann. Rev. Ecol. Syst. 13, 169-199

Ribeiro, P. D., Christy J. H., Rissanen R. J., Kim T. W. (2006).  Males are attracted by their own courtship signals. Behav Ecol Sociobiol 61:81–89. 

Ridley, M. (1993). The red queen: Sex and the evolution of human nature. New York: Viking. 

Rodriguez, R.L. & Snedden, W. (2004). On the functional design of mate preferences and receiver biases.  Animal Behaviour, 68, 427-432.

Ryan, M. J. (1990). Sexual selection, sensory systems and sensory exploitation. Oxford Surveys in Evolutionary Biology, 7, 157-195. 

Ryan, M. J. (1995). Female responses to ancestral advertisement calls in tungara frogs. Science, 269, 390-392. 

Ryan, M.J. (1998, review 1999). Sexual Selection, Receiver Biases, and the Evolution of Sex Differences. Science Vol. 281. no. 5385, 1999 – 2003.

Ryan, M. J. & Keddy-Hector, A. (1992). Directional patterns of female mate choice and the role of sensory biases. American Naturalist, Supplement, 139, 4-35. 

Ryan, M. J. & Rand, A. S. (1990). The sensory basis of sexual selection for complex calls in the tungara frog, Physalaemus pustulosus (sexual selection for sensory exploitation). Evolution, 44, 305-314. 

Ryan, M. J. & Rand, A. S. (1993). Sexual selection and signal evolution: the ghost of biases past. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, 340, 187-195. 

Salzburger, W., Braasch I., & Meyer A. (2007). Adaptive sequence evolution in a color gene involved in the formation of the characteristic egg-dummies of male haplochromine cichlid fishes. BMC Biology 2007 5:51.

Shaw, K. L. (1995). Phylogenetic tests of the sensory exploitation model of sexual selection. Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 10, 117-120. 

Shennan S. (2001). Demography and cultural innovation: a model and its implication for the emergence of modern human culture. Cambridge Archeol. J. 11: 5-16.

Sober, E. 1984. The Nature of Selection. Evolutionary Theory in 
Philosophical Focus. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 

Stiner M C & Kuhn S L (2006). Changes in the ‘Connectedness’ and Resilience of Paleolithic Societies in Mediterranean Ecosystems. Hum Ecol (2006) 34:693–712.

Tobler M. (2006). Die Eiflecken bei Cichliden: Evolution durch Nutzung der Sinne? (The eggspots of cichlids: Evolution through sensory exploitation?). Zeitschrift für Fischkunde, Bd. 8 Heft 1/2, S. 39-46.

van Schaik, C.P. & Knott, C.D. (2001). Geographic variation in tool use on Neesia fruits in orangutans. Am. J. Phys. Anthrop. 114, 331–342. 

van Schaik C. P. & Pradhana G. R. (2003). A model for tool-use traditions in primates: implications for
the coevolution of culture and cognition Journal of Human Evolution 44 (2003) 645–664.

Weatherhead, P. J., and R. J. Robertson. 1979. Offspring quality and the polygyny threshold: 'The sexy son hypothesis'. American Naturalist 113:201-208.

Weismann, A. (1893). The Germ Plasm: A Theory of Heredity, W. N. Parker and H. R. Ronnefeld, trans. London: Waller-Scott. 

West-Eberhard, M. J. 1984. Sexual selection, competitive communication, and species-specific signals in insects. In: Insect Communication (Ed. by T. Lewis), pp. 283-324. London: Academic Press. 

West-Eberhard, M. J. 1992. Adaptation: current usages. In: Keywords in Evolutionary Biology (Ed. by E. F. Keller & E. A. Lloyd), pp. 13-18. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 


White, R.  (1982). Rethinking the Middle/Upper Paleolithic Transition (and Comments and Replies). Current Anthropology, vol. 23, No 2, pp 169 – 192.

Wickler, W. (1962).  'Egg-dummies' as natural releasers in mouth-breeding cichlids. Nature, 194:1092-1093.

Williams, G. C. 1966. Adaptation and Natural Selection. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 

Zahavi, A.  (1975).  Mate selection: A selection for a handicap.  J. Theoretical Biology, 53, 205-214.

Zahavi, A. (1991). On the definition of sexual selection, Fisher’s model, and the evolution of 
waste and of signals in general. Animal Behaviour, 42(3), 501-503. 

Zahavi, A., & Zahavi, A. (1997). The handicap principle: A missing piece of Darwin's puzzle.  Oxford, UK: Oxford U. Press.



